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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
PEOPLE COUNTING AND OCCUPANCY MONITORING USING WIFI PROBE
REQUESTS AND UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
by
Edwin Vattapparamban
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor I˙smail Gu¨venc¸, Major Professor
Smart phones have become an important part of our daily lives due to their capabilities of
accessing the web using WiFi and mobile data networks. These WiFi equipment are con-
stantly sending out packets referred as probe requests, which can be tracked using wireless
sniffers. In this thesis, first we investigate capturing of WiFi probe request packets using the
help of WiFi Pineapple devices, and analyze how we can use signal strength information
of probe request data for indoor occupancy monitoring. Applications of such occupancy
monitoring into building surveillance and building energy management are also discussed.
After completing the initial test indoors, research was moved to outdoor monitoring
with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flying in various trajectories and cap-
turing probe request messages. The information captured from the probe requests is used
to identify and localize WiFi users with a single UAV, which can be instrumental in search
and rescue applications. Finally, we study in detail various security, privacy, and public
safety issues related to drones equipped with wireless communications capabilities.
iv
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Occupancy tracking has been active research topic because of the challenges and its impor-
tance. Buildings consume around 72% of electricity consumption and are considered to be
the largest consumers of electricity in the United States [8]. And occupancy monitoring of
people can be very helpful in saving significant energy in buildings. Another ways in which
monitoring can be via video processing, camera systems or deploying occupancy sensors
in buildings [9]. As installing new equipments can be costly an ideal solution is required.
Also in search and rescue operations outdoors with Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAV) [10]
tracking people in disastrous conditions is very vital. And in my thesis Wireless signals
can be used as alternative to identify occupants.
Probe requests are signals that are continuously broadcast from devices with WiFi tech-
nology, such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets [11, 12, 13, 14]. When a WiFi client
wants to get connected to a WiFi network, the first method is scanning for beacon frames,
which are frames broadcast by WiFi routers to tell about their presence to WiFi clients [15].
The second method is sending probe requests, which also contains the unique MAC address
of the device, as well its type, brand, manufacturer, and model. Since a WiFi client itself
can initiate a connection to a WiFi router instead of waiting for a beacon frame from the
router, use of probe requests is preferable. The probe requests are not encrypted, and can
be captured and decoded with the help of wireless sniffers passively, without connecting to
a particular network or transmitting any signal.
1
It is possible to capture the received signal strength (RSS) information of probe requests
using sniffers such as WiFi Pineapple (WiFi-PA) [16]. This information can then be used
for occupancy monitoring inside the building. Probe requests are bursty in nature as they
are broadcasted in the air in search of WiFi networks to get connected, to get a list of
available networks, or to handover between WiFi APs. Frequent transmission of probe
requests introduces an opportunity to track occupancy of building by simply monitoring
probe requests. To our best knowledge, there are no detailed studies in the literature that
report efficiency of occupancy tracking using WiFi probe requests. Our work is unique
about using WiFi probe requests for occupancy tracking.
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), also known as drone, is an aircraft with no pi-
lot on board. Enabled by recent technological advances, miniaturization, and open-source
hardware/software initiatives [17, 18, 19], UAVs have found several key applications re-
cently [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Their use in several different contexts are quickly
transforming from a futuristic idea to reality. Amazon, for example, claims that seeing its
Prime Air order delivery UAVs in the sky is expected to be as conventional as seeing mail
trucks on the road within the next few years1. Google and Facebook have been investigat-
ing the use of a network of high-altitude balloons2. and drones3. over specific population
centers for providing broadband connectivity. Such solar-powered drones are capable of
flying several years without refueling. UAVs can also be used to deliver broadband data
rates in emergency and public safety situations through low-altitude platforms [27].
In this thesis, occupancy tracking has been done using linear least square estimation
method along with security issues in WiFi enabled Smartphones have been discussed [28].
1http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8037720011
2http://www.google.com/loon/
3https://info.internet.org/en/approach/
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After that, a detailed survey about Drones have been conducted with issues related to Cy-
bersecurity and Privacy [29].
3
CHAPTER II
Literature Review
This section summarizes issues regarding location analytics and tracking and also privacy
and security related to probe request messages and are classified in Table 1. Also, a study
on challenges and concerns to be addressed in the areas of cybersecurity,privacy and public
safety.
2.1 Location Analytics, Search and Rescue.
WiFi probe requests messages sent from WiFi enabled Smartphone devices are used in lo-
cation analytics of shoppers. To improve marketing, business firms are using probe request
informations to understand the frequency of shoppers visiting stores. And this information
can be used for advertising purposes, to estimate number of people at peak hours. In [30],
Cisco Meraki Aps are used to capture probe requests packets from users. This data is sent
to the cloud and processed, where a database is generated that uses algorithms to study
the patterns of shoppers. As, these are vital informations gathered from Smartphones to
maintain privacy, only hashed version of the MAC address is stored in the database so that
the users identity is not revealed. Euclid Analytics [31] and Libelium [32] are other prod-
ucts that can be used for similar purposes. In [14, 15], data mining techniques are used to
extract meaningful information from database of probe requests.
In [33], it is shown that use of probe request information can be utilized in search and
rescue operations. In particular, a WiFi-equipped drone actively broadcasts request-to-send
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(RTS) frames (100 per second) to trigger transmission of probe requests from a victim WiFi
device. This information is then used to coarsely estimate the location of the WiFi device.
Our work is different from the above studies in the sense that we capture the probe request
for occupancy monitoring purposes. Privacy is maintained in the sense that the addresses
are anonymized as in [30].
Category References
Location Analytics and Statistics [30, 14, 15, 32, 31, 33]
Trajectory Tracking [13, 34, 35, 36]
Privacy and Security [11, 37, 12, 38, 39, 40, 41]
Table 1: Literature related to WiFi probe requests.
2.2 Trajectory Tracking
Probe request information have been used for second-by-second detection of a moving de-
vice (walking, driving) in [13] for outdoor environments. Subsequently, trajectory estima-
tion of the mobile device is obtained using the Viterbi algorithm. Triangulation of mobile
user locations by jointly using probe requests at multiple reference positions is not con-
sidered. Other recent work that study trajectory tracking using probe request information
include [34, 35, 36]. However, typically outdoor locations are considered, and triangulation
and zone-level localization of a mobile device’s position, as targeted by our work, is not
explicitly studied.
2.3 Privacy and Security
In [42], tracking of WiFi users by passively capturing probe requests using WiFi sensors
deployed at various locations is presented. The mobile user is assumed to be within the
zone of its strongest WiFi sensor, and as opposed to our work, no explicit triangulation
techniques are considered to fuse information from multiple WiFi sensors. Various tests
were carried out using Android and Apple phones/tablets. Results show that more probe
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requests are sent when the device is in active mode (screen on) and not connected to any
network, which can be used for tracking individual users based on RSS information. Even
though companies such as Libelium [32] and Euclid Analytics [31] claim that privacy pre-
serving techniques are possible, [42] shows that de-anonymization of a protected dataset is
possible using different attacks. In another work [12], various privacy-related threats due
to use of WiFi probe requests and factors affecting transmit frequency of probe requests
have been discussed. Tests were conducted by keeping the phones in many different con-
figurations such as connected mode and airplane mode. The maximum probing frequency
is observed to happen when a device attempts to connect to a known network in its area.
It is also shown that for a commercially deployed MAC randomization mechanism, it is
possible to re-identify anonymized probes.
In [38], an attack referred as KARMA is described, in which the attacker automati-
cally sends beacon and probe response frames for every received probe request, to direct
the clients to his own network. This allows full control of the data sent by connected
clients over the attacker’s network. Authors in [38] introduce a detection mechanism for
KARMA attacks, in which directed probe requests are sent with random SSIDs, and based
on received probe responses the attacker can be identified. In [39], it is shown that early
stage of probe-request WiFi attacks can be identified with help of neural networks. In [37],
hash-based anonymization of MAC addresses captured from probe requests are shown to
be defeatable, while [41, 40] report various privacy vulnerabilities of mobile devices due
to use of probe requests.
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CHAPTER III
Occupancy monitoring in Buildings using WiFi Probe Requests
Occupancy monitoring is important as they can be used for applications such as energy
management, surveillance, and security. In this section, we passively capture probe request
messages using WiFi Pineapple equipment and the information is used to understand oc-
cupancy zones and obtain occupancy count with respect to each zone and at different time
intervals.
3.1 Capturing Probe Request Data with WiFi Pineapple
In the experiments, eight different WiFi Pineapple equipment are deployed at various loca-
tions at FIU EC 3rd Floor as shown in Fig. 1. We use the tcpdump sniffer to capture WiFi
packets. As we are only interested in receiving the WiFi probe requests, all the other pack-
ets are filtered out and only WiFi probes are received. The data captured at WiFi Pineapple
includes time stamps providing the time at which the data was captured, MAC address of
the WiFi enabled device, and the signal strength of the WiFi device.
All the WiFi Pineapple equipment are powered using a power adapter that is connected
to an electric outlet. The scripts that we use to control each Pineapple can be executed via
their terminal. They support boot modes which comes with five user configurable switches
that help in automated execution of multiple commands using the terminal. Using the web
interface, we specify which script to run on which equipment, and as soon as the device
is booted and switches points out to our script, it starts executing commands. One of the
7
Figure 1: Map of FIU Engineering Center 3rd Floor.
problems faced during our experimentation was that the internal clock time of the device
keeps on changing every time it reboots which gives us wrong data capture timings. In
order to address this problem, we forced each WiFi Pineapple to automatically connect to
a WiFi network. Subsequently, using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server the current
date and time was synchronized with the time at the local network.
3.2 Database Server for Storing Probe Request Data
In order to obtain the data capture information from the deployed WiFi Pineapple equip-
ment, a Linux server has been set up. This makes it convenient to receive all the information
at a centralized location. The data is stored in the SD card of the WiFi pineapple device
for a day, and at the end of the day the captured data is sent to the server. Subsequently,
each WiFi Pineapple starts capturing new data automatically, while also storing the back-
up of the data in the SD card. The data is obtained in the packet capture format and can be
viewed in Wireshark software [43], which is a packet analyzer that is used to convert the
packets into comma separated variable (CSV) format that can be imported into MATLAB
for further processing. The data is transferred from the the device to the server using Linux
command SCP. In this command we enter the source address and the destination address
8
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Figure 2: Raw measurements of RSS.
we want to send the file. This also provides the time stamp of the file transfer, making it
easy to search for particular packet capture file according to the date and time.
3.3 Pre-Processing Data for Location Estimation
The data captured and saved into server has to be pre-processed before using them in lo-
calization and tracking algorithm. First, the RSS data is resampled in time due to its bursty
nature. For example, there may be several probe requests from the same user within few
hundred milliseconds, followed by a silent period that may last several seconds. In order
to have uniformly sampled RSS captures, we average the received RSS values within one
second intervals. After resampling the RSS measurements, the data needed to be interpo-
lated for measurement intervals that do not have any RSS readings, and are also within
close vicinity of other measurement intervals which have RSS readings. This is critical for
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Figure 3: Processed data of RSS.
estimation since it needs at least four different measurements as subsequently stated in 3.4.
In Fig. 2 raw measurements and Fig. 3 processed data of RSS from 8 WiFi-PAs are shown,
where the locations of WiFi-PAs are as reported in Fig. 1. The post-processed data can be
used conveniently for localization of users based on probe request information RSS.
The cumulative distributions of RSS for each WiFi-PAs and overall is shown in Fig. 4.
As it can be seen more than 70% of RSS values lie between −90 dBm and −70 dBm.
This information is helpful about outlier detection. In this work, an RSS value smaller than
−100 dBm or larger than −30 dBm is regarded as outlier and not considered for results.
3.4 Device Localization Using Probe Requests
After post-processing of the data, localization techniques are used to get occupancy counts
with respect to time for FIU EC 3rd floor. In [44], localization of WiFi APs are studied
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Figure 4: CDF of RSS for different WiFi-PAs.
with unknown transmit power and path loss exponent (PLE). In our case we are localizing
the devices with the help of WiFi-PAs, and transmission configurations of different WiFi
equipment may have large variations [45]. Therefore, we use a similar technique to that
of [44] for localizing users with unknown transmit powers.
The unknown position of a random user is denoted as (x0,y0) and the location of the
ith WiFi Pineapple is denoted as (xi,yi), where 1≤ i≤ k. The RSS measurement in the ith
position is denoted as ri. The true distance between the user and the ith reference node is
then given by:
di =
√
(x0− xi)2+(y0− yi)2, (1)
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and the path-loss model is for the RSS is:
Pr = P0−10n log10(d/l0)+Xσ, (2)
where Pr is the RSS, P0 is signal strength at the reference distance l0, n is the PLE which
depends on the physical environment, and Xσ is the noise modeled by a Gaussian random
variable with a standard deviation of σ and mean of zero. Using (2) the distance between
transmitter and ith WiFi Pineapple is estimated as:
dˆi = 10(P0−ri)/10n. (3)
Multilateration is the most known and used localization technique when distance esti-
mates of at least three non-collinear reference positions are available. As it can be seen
in (1), distance estimation requires the knowledge of transmit power and PLE. A linear
approximation is used to overcome this situation in [44] as:
10(P0−ri)/10n ≈ a0+a1((P0− ri)/10n), (4)
where a0 and a1 are the linearization coefficients. It is shown that the linearization coeffi-
cients do not affect the localization accuracy. Subtracting all approximations of RSS from
12
different WiFi-PAs:

−x21− y21+ x2k + y2k
−x22− y22+ x2k + y2k
· · ·
−x2k−1− y2k−1+ x2k + y2k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
y
=

−2x1+2xk −2y1+2yk a1(r1−rk)5
−2x2+2xk −2y2+2yk a1(r2−rk)5
· · ·
−2xk−1+2xk −2yk−1+2yk a1(rk−1−rk)5

︸ ︷︷ ︸
H

x0
y0
1
n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
(5)
where k ≥ 4, and the k-th WiFi-PA is selected as reference for linearization. The final
solution for (x0,y0, 1n) is given by:
xˆ = (HT H)−1HT y. (6)
3.5 Occupancy Tracking
Our final goal is real-time occupancy monitoring, by counting the number of users within
coarsely defined occupancy zones in the area of interest. To this end, past location estimates
of users should be considered collectively for accurate occupancy tracking. The very simple
idea of using new location estimates solely to draw a trajectory leads to wasting the history
of RSS and the previous estimates. There are also some models which take advantage of
previous RSS measurements and location estimates in time.
In this paper, a weighted k-means algorithm is used for tracking users, in order to take
advantage of their past location estimates. As a tracking algorithm, k-nearest neighbour
13
1: procedure WKNN TRACKING
2: xˆk = (HTk Hk)
−1HTk yk . k-th location estimate
3: for ∀ti < T, i ∈ K do
4: wi = (T − ti)/ ∑
i∈K
(T − ti) . Weight calculation
5: end
6: uˆk = ∑
i∈K
wixˆi/ ∑
i∈K
wi . Tracking result
7: arg j min(D j), ∀D j < L, j ∈M
8: GridCell← j
9: end procedure
Figure 5: Pseudocode for the proposed WKNN technique for tracking mobile devices.
is well-known and easy to implement as shown in [46]. Different than [46], we consider
here that the algorithm weights the k-nearest neighbour measurements with respect to mea-
surements’ time difference to the last one, thus it can be called as time-weighted k-nearest
neighbour measurements (WKNN). While using WKNN, a time threshold is also consid-
ered to increase the accuracy and reliability of tracking via discarding obsolete estimates.
After using WKNN algorithm, the final estimate is mapped to the nearest zone point this
time with distance threshold. If the resultant point is further away than a threshold to a
zone’s center, it can not be mapped to that cell.
The pseudocode for the WKNN tracking algorithm is shown in Fig. 5 where xˆk is the kth
location estimate, ti is the time difference between ith measurement and kth measurement,
T is the threshold for obsoleteness of measurement, K is the set of last k measurements,
wi is the weight of ith estimate, uˆk is updated sequence of location estimates after the
tracking algorithm, D j is the distance between tracking result and jth grid cell center, L is
the distance threshold for mapping to a grid location, and M is the set of grid cells.
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Figure 6: Number of probe requests captured from each WiFi-PA.
3.6 Numerical and Experimental Results
3.6.1 Occupancy Tracking
In this section, we will present our numerical results on occupancy tracking based on the
collected and post-processed data. Counting the number of probe requests received by
particular WiFi-PA would be helpful about understanding WiFi activity around that WiFi-
PA. On the other hand, it might also be misleading since the number of probe requests
can be increased solely by a particular device. For example, in our experiments we have
seen that wireless printers may increase the number of probe requests heavily. For this
reason, number of unique MAC addresses detected by a WiFi-PA gives a better hint about
the number of WiFi devices and hence the occupancy of that region.
To this end, in Fig. 6, number of unique WiFi probe requests captured at each WiFi-PA
is presented as a function of time. It can be observed that there may be over 400 unique
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Figure 7: Detected number of people in gridded areas.
MAC addresses, captured within one hour at certain WiFi-PAs. Note that this number may
also include devices that are in the vicinity of FIU EC building. In Fig. 7, we explicitly
triangulate users into one of the eight zones in Fig. 1, which requires RSS information to
be captured at least by 4 WiFi-PAs. While the number of unique detected devices is much
lower compared to Fig. 6, Fig. 7 gives more reliable information about the occupancy
pattern at different zones within the building. Fig. 8 provides occupancy pattern with one
minute sampling interval between 12 PM to 12:30 PM, which can be used to extract fine-
grained information for occupancy patterns.
In Fig. 9, total number of unique devices detected in gridded areas is given with respect
to time, which shows that the peak hours of occupancy occurs between 10 AM and 2 PM.
The number of detected devices drops to less than one fifth of peak hours after 4 PM. The
difference between the number of devices detected and located can be explained with the
help of Fig. 10. In the figure, the number of detected unique MACs throughout the day is
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Figure 8: Number of total people in gridded areas between 12 PM to 12:30 PM.
given with respect to number of WiFi-PAs that have detected them. It is clear that more than
half of devices are detected by only a single WiFi-PA. As stated earlier, the device needs to
be detected by at least four different WiFi-PA to be included in occupancy monitoring.
3.6.2 MAC Randomization
WiFi-based occupancy tracking algorithms generally utilize RSS or connection informa-
tion matching MAC addresses of devices [9]. Thus the MAC address randomization fea-
ture which is available as a privacy preserving method in certain commercial smart phones
is investigated in this section. The first 24 bits of the MAC address is considered as the Or-
ganizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), which differentiates the devices according to their
manufactures. The last 24 bits, on the other hand, are unique serial numbers assigned by
manufacturers. The unique MAC address of devices can be easily captured and monitored
from probe request messages since they are not encrypted. For example, owner of a net-
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Figure 9: Number of total people in gridded areas per hour.
work can restrict certain MAC addresses not to connect to a network. Having a fixed MAC
address also introduces several security and privacy issues as discussed in Section II. In
order to address such privacy concerns, recently, Apple introduced the iOS 8 operating sys-
tem at Worldwide Developers Conference (WWDC) on September 17th 2014. The most
interesting feature in the new operating system was that MAC addresses will be randomized
automatically making it difficult for an outsider to keep track of a user continuously.
We used Wireshark to capture probe requests of an iOS 8.4 Apple phone and to evaluate
the MAC address randomization feature of iOS 8. In order to have a randomized MAC
address, the location services should be switched off, and the phone must first go into sleep
mode while WiFi is switched on and not associated to a particular WiFi network. When the
devices goes into sleep mode, it takes around 150 seconds to send out randomized MACs,
and keeps on sending the same randomized MACs at equal intervals. If the device screen
is used and then goes into sleep mode again, iO8 will be sending probes with randomized
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Figure 10: Histogram of number of WiFi-PAs that see unique MAC addresses.
MAC, which is different than the randomized MAC in previous cycle [47]. This feature
helps in changing the MAC address at every sleep cycle.
Experimental results for the considered iOS 8 device are shown Fig. 11. The real MAC
address of the phone is dc:86:d8:b7:70:f3 and first 24 bits is the OUI of Apple as identi-
fied by Wireshark. After the phone satisfies the conditions described earlier, MAC address
gets first randomized into e6:59:5f:6c:f4:f5. When we bring the phone back from sleep
mode it again starts emitting the real MAC, and when it goes into sleep mode a new MAC
da:94:ba:e1:43:7a appears, which is different from the earlier randomized MAC. After
repeating this cycle, the randomized MAC is observed to change again into another dif-
ferent MAC 82:52:34:80:c3:3b. The RSS information for static and randomized MACs
are also seen to be similar, which can be used as an additional information for detection
of randomized MACs. When the device was connected to a network and then goes into
the sleep mode, no randomization of MACs are found; instead, iOS will be probing for the
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Figure 11: Randomization of MAC address at a smart phone with iOS 8 operating system.
previously connected network, as it gets disconnected with the network in sleep mode.
While the randomization of MAC addresses provides security to WiFi users, there are
ways to identify randomized MACs. For example, MAC addresses must be registered with
IEEE standards association [48], and Wireshark automatically filters out MAC addresses
which do not comply with this criteria. Even though MAC randomization feature is not
provided by the Android operating system, it can be achieved in rooted Android devices
by manually changing the MAC addresses, or using specific apps [49]. In our study we
determined 1464 randomized MAC addresses generated by 1639 identified Apple phones.
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CHAPTER IV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Cybersecurity, Privacy and Public Safety
In Section 4.1, recent FAA regulations related to use of drones are summarized. Section 4.2
reviews few of the major small commercial drones which are more pervasively available
in the market. Section 4.4 discusses how drones can be used as cyber attack tools, while
Section 4.3 is on vulnerabilities of drones to cyber attacks. Detection and interdiction of
unauthorized and potentially malicious drones are discussed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 lists
some other applications of drones in smart cities, such as for search and rescue, forensics,
and public safety communications
4.1 Recent Regulations on Drones
For maintaining the safety of manned aircrafts and the public, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) in the United States have developed rules to regulate the use of small
UAVs. For example, FAA recently requires each small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
that weighs more than 0.55 lbs and below 55 lbs to be registered in their system1. If not
complied with the FAA regulations, the owner of a drone can face civil and criminal penal-
ties. The FAA has also released a smartphone application B4UFLY2. which provides drone
users awareness about any restrictions in the location they are planning to operate the drone.
1http://www.faa.gov/uas/registration/
2http://www.faa.gov/uas/b4ufly
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The Know Before You Fly3. campaign by FAA aims to educate public about UAV safety
and responsibilities.
Overall, FAA regulations for small UAVs include flying them under 400 feet with no
obstacles around, maintaining a line of sight with the UAV at all times, not flying UAVs
within 5 miles from an airport unless permission is received from the airport and control
tower, avoiding endangering of people or aircraft, and not flying near people and stadiums.
FAA exempts public aircraft operations by issuing a Certificate of Waiver or Authoriza-
tion (COA), which allows operators to use airspace for safety provisions. Most of the
public uses of UAVs include firefighting, search and rescue, and disaster relief. For civil
operations, FAA authorization can be received either by Section 333 Exemption (i.e., by is-
suing a COA), or by Special Airworthiness Certificate (SAC) in which applicants describe
about their design, software development, and control, along with how and where they
intend to fly. FAA also enforces Federal Aviation Regulations along with Law Enforce-
ment Agencies (LEAs) to deter, detect, investigate, and stop unauthorized and unsafe UAV
operations4.
4.2 Review of Major Small UAVs
In this section, we will review and compare four commercially available and popular small
UAVs, in terms of their basic features, wireless communications capabilities, and security
vulnerabilities: Parrot AR Drone 2.0, Bebob Drone, Phantom 2 Vision Drone, and 3D
Robotics Solo Drone.
3http://knowbeforeyoufly.org/
4https://www.faa.gov/uas/
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4.2.1 Parrot AR Drone 2.0
Parrot AR Drone is built by a French company called Parrot and was first revealed in 2010.
Subsequently, its version 2.0 was revealed at Consumer Electronics Show (CES) Las Vegas
in 2012. It includes a 1 GHz 32 bit ARM Cortex A8 processor with 1 Gbit RAM and
supports Wi-Fi b,g,n. It comes along with a Linux machine called BusyBox5., which has
Unix tools in an executable file and can run over various operating system interfaces like
Linux and Android. This drone can be controlled using various interfaces, like using an
Android or iOS app to take images and videos to be stored in the phones and also using
tools like LabVIEW which has a dedicated tool kit to control it called AR Drone Toolkit6.
In [50], AR Drones were used in unknown areas for surveillance, for spying and to detect
suspicious devices and objects using an extended Kalman filter. Drones can be controlled
using various other programming languages such as Python, javascript, and node.js7. Due
to their ease of programming, AR Drones have been very popular, and have been used in
events such as Nodecopter8 , where many developers come in a group of three, and are
provided with AR Drones to showcase their work to other participants.
4.2.2 Bebop Drone
Bebop drone is also built by Parrot, and is much powerful compared to Parrot AR Drone 2.0.
Bebop weighs around 400 g and it uses a P7 dual core CPU, quad-core GPU, and 8 GB of
memory. It comes with a device called Skycontroller, which is used to improve its range.
5https://busybox.net/about.html
6https://ardronelabviewtoolkit.wordpress.com/
7https://github.com/felixge/node-ar-drone/
8http://www.nodecopter.com/
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 12: (a) Parrot AR Drone 2.0 [1], (b)Bebop Drone [2], (c) Phantom 2 Vision [3], and
(d) 3D Robotics Solo [4].
One of the important features in the drone with respect to the drone regulations is that we
can select our country in the network settings of the application, which helps us to fly the
drone keeping the drone regulations easy to obey in the selected country. Bebop drone uses
an IEEE WiFi radio type of 802.11ac, i.e. they can be operated both in 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz
range. To maximize the range it is preferable to use 2.4 GHz WiFi and for better quality
of videos it is preferable to use 5 GHz WiFi. Bebop’s WiFi network uses an IP address
of 192.168.42.1. This drone has an open FTP server which includes images, videos and
black box readings. Therefore, flight recordings, GPS locations of the drone, among other
information, can be easily accessed by an outsider due to open FTP server9.
9https://github.com/cucx/bebop
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4.2.3 Phantom 2 Vision Drone
Phantom 2 Vision is built by DJI, founded in 2006. It manufactures UAVs for aerial pho-
tography. This drone uses a mobile phone first person view (FPV) system with wireless
connection range of up to 300 m, and supports 14 Megapixels image resolution. Receiver
range of this drone is attained with the help of a range extender and is larger when com-
pared to other drones. It uses a 2.4 GHz Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), within
2.4 GHz to 2.488 GHz band. Live video is available using the DJI Vision App, connecting
the drone with the help of range extender. However, WiFi network has no security fea-
tures, and WiFi network name cannot be changed because it should remain fixed to allow
the drone to get associated with it. Range extender is a Linux machine that uses Open-
WRT10., which always has an IP address of 192.168.1.2. Additionally, Phantom 2 Vision
has two other Linux systems: One to access the SD card to obtain the images and record-
ings using IP 192.168.1.1, and other system is used for recording and encoding using IP
address 192.168.1.10. Therefore, it is vulnerable to attacks which allows others to access
data packets and GPS coordinates of the drone11.
4.2.4 3D Robotics Solo Drone
Solo Drone is manufactured by 3D Robotics and is considered as the world’s first smart
drone with dual 1 GHz Linux computers: one on the drone and the other on the controller
along with a GoPro attached to the drone. The HD video is obtained straight from the
GoPro to 3DR solo application in an Android or an iOS phone. It uses a Pixhawk 2 au-
10https://openwrt.org/
11https://github.com/noahwilliamsson/dji-phantom-vision
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(MAC: 90:03:B7:70:8B:E2)
Figure 13: De-authentication attack on a drone.
topilot with a flight time of approximately 20 minutes12. This drone is considered to be
more secure than the drones discussed in earlier sections, because of its secured password
protection. Initially, when we try to access the drone we connect to the network beginning
with SoloLink with an initial password sololink, which can be changed later. However,
since we have to keep the network name as SoloLink followed by alphanumeric charac-
ters, it makes it easy to understand that its the Solo drone’s network. Therefore, while cyber
hacking into the drone might be difficult, a de-authentication attack can be performed to
disconnect the communication link between drone and the controller.
4.3 Cyber Attacks on Drones
Drones controlled by WiFi use IEEE 802.11 standards. All the communication between the
drone and ground station controller typically use the WiFi network, which is vulnerable to
security breaches. In particular, an unencrypted Wi-Fi used at a drone allows any individual
to connect and hack the drone. For example, software such as Skyjack13. can be used to
seek out and wirelessly control other drones within the range, and create an army of drones.
12https://3dr.com/solo-drone/
13http://samy.pl/skyjack/
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In particular, SkyJack can detect all wireless networks and can deactivate clients connected
to a drone, and then use node.js with node-ar-drone to control the drone. This drawback
can be solved by using Wi-Fi protected access14., which provides password authentication
to the drone and will not be easy for a hacker to gain access to the drone.
We have performed experiments with the help of a WiFi Pineapple15., AR Drone, Be-
bop and Phantom 2 Drone. Since these drones have WiFi, they create a wireless network
which allows users to connect to them. These access point (AP) names are basically the
drone name followed by the last two octets of the MAC address which makes it easy to find
them; otherwise, they can be found by scanning, using the Organizational Unique Identi-
fiers (OUI) which remains the same for all the drones from a given manufacturing company.
Later, we try to connect to their network using the Linux command iwconfig and we can
check our connection using ping command to their IP addresses. If we receive back an IP
message we can confirm that our connection is successful and we have complete control
over the drone. We perform these tasks using the WiFi Pineapple device which comes with
boot switches, and can run the program as soon as the device is turned on. This helps in
performing automated tasks, e.g., every time a drone is found, commands will be executed
automatically.
4.3.1 De-authentication Attack
As shown in Fig. 13, we can perform a de-authentication attack on drones by using aircrack-
ng16. Initially, a passive scan is made to search for the wireless network. After a network
is found, using airodump-ng (from aircrack-ng), packets from only that particular wire-
14https://github.com/daraosn/ardrone-wpa2/
15http://hakshop.myshopify.com/products/wifi-pineapple
16http://www.aircrack-ng.org/
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Figure 14: De-authentication packets have been set from an attacker to a Parrot AR Drone
2.0. The MAC address of the drone is 90:03:B7:70:8B:E2, while the MAC address of the
smartphone is BC:F5:AC:F6:C7:57.
less network can be filtered and stored. Then the list of clients associated with network is
available and de-authentication attack can be performed. The clients are de-authenticated
using aireplay-ng (again within aircrack-ng), which sends disassociate packets to connected
clients, for disconnecting them from the AP.
In Fig. 14, a screen shot of the sent de-authentication packets are shown, where 90:03:B7:70:8B:E2
is the BSSID of the drone. In this experiment, aireplay-ng software is waiting to receive a
beacon frame from the Parrot AR Drone which creates an AP for the clients to connect. Af-
ter a beacon frame is received it starts sending disassociate packets to its connected clients.
This results in the connection between the client (in this case BC:F5:AC:F6:C7:57) and
the drone being lost. In this case, the disassociate packets are only sent to one particular
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client. Even if we try to make the drone secure by using a WPA 2 authentication 17., it is
possible to disassociate them. We can also jam the complete AP network by continuously
sending disassociation packets, disallowing anyone to connect to the network. Connection
is regained later once the de-authentication packets are stopped being transmitted and when
the client sends an association packet to the AP. Once the client gets disconnected from the
drone due to the de-authentication attack, a link lost message is displayed.
The aireplay-ng command18. for the de-authentication attack firsts waits to receive
beacon from the BSSID and then sends directed de-authentications as shown in Fig. 14. In
particular, the command sends 128 deauth packets, out of which 64 packets are sent to the
BSSID and 64 packets are sent to the selected client. In the last column of Fig. 14, first
number represents the number of ACKs received from the client, while the second number
represents the number of ACKs received from the UAV. The ACKs for the client can go
above 64 packets when the client is actively participating with the BSSID or when ACKs
from the previous packets is received. A number very smaller than 64 indicates the client is
far away with weak signal strength, and zero value indicates that packets have not reached
to the client.
4.3.2 GPS Spoofing Attack
GPS spoofing attack is another type of cyber attack commonly performed on drones. The
communication links in drones include incoming signals from GPS satellites, signals noti-
fying the drone’s presence, and a two-way link between the ground station and the drone.
GPS enables a drone’s navigation, and due to no encryption of the signals they can be
easily spoofed. In December 2011, Iranian forces claimed to have captured a Lockheed
17https://github.com/daraosn/ardrone-wpa2
18http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=deauthentication
29
Spoofing 
Transmitter Spoofed Path
Satellite-1 Satellite-3Satellite-2
Drone
with GPS
Figure 15: GPS spoofing attack Scenario, which changes the actual path of the Drone with
a spoofed trajectory.
Martin RQ-170 Sentinel drone, operated by United States Air Force (USAF), and President
Barack Obama asked for the return of the drone which was initially rejected by Iranian of-
ficials [51]. A major possibility that may have caused the loss of the drone is a cyber attack
on the GPS system, which could be a GPS-spoofing attack.
The basic idea in GPS spoofing is transmitting fake GPS coordinates to the control
system of the drone. This will hijack the drone and subsequently it will be in complete
control of the attacker. For a GPS spoofing attack, a transmitter is used to transmit false
GPS signals forcing the victim to synchronize with the attacker’s signals. For example, in
Fig. 15, three satellites are sending true GPS signals to the drone, constantly allowing it to
fly in a desired path. An attacker can use a transmitter to send false GPS signals, which
deters its path and sends the drone in a direction specified by the attacker. A successful
attack is conducted when attacker is very close to the drone, or by using a directional
antenna with narrow beamwidth aiming the drone. Due to no authentication mechanism,
civilian drones can be attacked easily by delaying signals, while attacks on military drones
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Figure 16: (a) Experimental setup with WiFi Pineapple mounted on a drone, and (b) Attack
model using a WiFi Pineapple.
are complicated due to use of authentication mechanisms [52].
Researchers from UT-Austin were successfully able to demonstrate GPS spoofing at-
tack, which can force a UAV to follow a trajectory set by the spoofer, proving that such
an attack was technically and operationally feasible. For demonstration, initially the drone
was made to hover in a particular location with the help of authentic signals. Later, spoofed
signals were transmitted and they were aligned within the legitimate GPS signals received
by the UAV. After overpowering the authentic GPS signals, spoofer changed the veloc-
ity and position of the UAV and another safety pilot was used to control it from drifting
away [53, 54]. Recently in Defcon 23, 2013, a security researcher explained how to carry
out GPS spoofing attacks [55] on cars and UAVs. Initially, GPS information is captured
using USRP B210 software defined radio (SDR), and it is replayed back using a bladeRF
SDR. Using these devices it is also possible to change the time and date of the GPS signal.
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4.4 Drones as Cyber Attack Tools
Drones are vulnerable to many of the attacks but can also be used in malicious and harmful
ways. As discussed in19, a young teenager was charged to modify a drone to make it a fire
handgun. In Defcon 2120, a security researcher used a DJI Phantom mounted with a WiFi
Pineapple to sniff wireless signals. Built-in tools like airdoump-ng, sslstrip were used to
dissect the wireless data. The basic idea was to fly the drone and land it over a building or
balcony for a particular time collecting data and bring it back to the starting position using
return to home position. The connection with the WiFi Pineapple is maintained over a 3G
connection by Reverse SSH tunnel, i.e. by creating an SSH relay server21. In this section,
we will provide one particular example on the use of drones as cyber attack tools: sniffing
signals using a virtual private network (VPN).
4.4.1 Sniffing Signals using a Virtual Private Network
In order to sniff WiFi signals, a WiFi Pineapple carried at a drone can be utilized. In our
setup, we are mounting the WiFi Pineapple on the drone along with a smartphone as shown
in Fig. 16(a), where the smartphone will provide Internet connection to WiFi Pineapple.
There are multiple ways in which we can access the device. One of them is using an
Ethernet cable connected to the device and the laptop. And another way is connecting it
wirelessly by connecting to its AP within its WiFi range.
Since the device mounted on the drone will be flying at heights and distances that may
be far away, it is not possible to connect using any of the above methods. Therefore, as
19http://www.smh.com.au/technology/web-culture
20https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-21/dc-21-presentations/Hill/DEFCON-21.pdf
21https://hak5.org/episodes/hak5-1520
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Figure 17: Threat model for UAVs in a protected area based on MITRE Challenge frame-
work [5].
shown in Fig. 16(b), we created a VPN between the WiFi Pineapple and our own devices,
thus making it possible to access the device from anywhere by just providing Internet con-
nection to the WiFi Pineapple. VPN is basically used for client-server applications. The
question might arise about the security of these devices and what if an intruder tries to inter-
cept the server’s communication. The OpenVPN22., which we are using to create a virtual
private network, creates a symmetric key of size 2014 bits and is exchanged between the
server and the client using Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
4.5 Interdiction of Unauthorized Drones
UAVs can be launched in any territory for constant surveillance and monitoring, and they
can also be used to perform certain types of cyber/physical attacks that may harm prop-
erty and civilians. As the cost of the drones is going down, the number of hobbyists and
industries using them is increasing. Thus, it gets difficult to identify unauthorized drones
22https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/ OpenVPN
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(a) (b)
Figure 18: Taking down malicious drones using (a) Net traps used by other larger
drones [6], and (b) Eagle trained to catch a drone and place in a safe zone [7].
and bring down such drones when necessary. They can cause danger for civilian aircrafts,
and there have been reports of near misses with UAVs and aircrafts, such as the near col-
lision incidents with Boeing 737 in the British Airport23. It is critical that small UAVs are
restricted to enter protected areas, and an unauthorized UAV that may be a potential threat
should be detected, interdicted, and brought down in a safe zone. These have also been the
major goal in MITRE Challenge, summarized in Fig. 17 [5], where the threat model shows
how the trajectory of the drone can cause a threat. If the trajectory of the UAV is outside
the protected area, it is considered to be safe. If the trajectory goes within the protected
area it needs to be detected and brought down outside of the protected zone.
One way in which a drone could be brought down is by using another drone. In [6],
Tokyo police created a drone squad for privacy breaches. Police department were handed
over net-carrying drones that will trap suspicious drones flying in the vicinity as shown in
Fig. 18. Before any attempt to trap the drone, suspicious drone operator will be warned and
if refused will be trapped and questioned further.
23http://i-hls.com/2016/02/iata-chiefdrones-pose-realthreat-to-civilian-aviations
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Cyber hacking one drone with the help of another drone is another possible alternative,
because of the excess use of commercial drones using a WiFi network to control the flight.
This makes it open to security vulnerabilities like de-authentication attacks or brute forcing
into the drone’s WiFi network. In [56], a Parrot AR Drone is interdicted using a Phantom
Vision 2 equipped with a WiFi Pineapple. A shell script is used with command utility
called as empty, which uses the concept of pseudo-terminals used on SSH sessions. Here,
the Parrot drone acts as the slave and WiFi Pineapple at the Phantom drone acts as the
master. Thus, as commands are entered in the master device it will be executed in the slave
device, making it completely under the control of the WiFi Pineapple device.
As shown in Fig. 18, Scotland metropolitan police came up with an innovative idea of
training eagles to take down suspicious drones [7]. This idea was very much successful as
it was not required to use any other devices and was very cost effective with no danger to
civilians. Eagles were made to consider drones as preys so that they catch them and place
them in a safe area. In
4.6 Privacy, Forensics, Search and Rescue
One of the major concerns due to use of drones is the privacy. It is easy to mount a camera
or a device to capture information, which may occasionally invade the privacy of people. To
overcome such concerns, Center of Democracy and Technology (CDT) have asked FAA to
issue rules on privacy and recommends on using data collection statement to know whether
the information collected will be retained, used or disclosed. The most suitable means to
maintain privacy was considered as Privacy by Design (PbD), which helps in maintaining
standards and provides remedies for security breaches. By adopting PbD principles, privacy
intrusion becomes limited and privacy can be ensured at an early stage [10].
Privacy was considered a major concern when a UAV goes beyond line of sight, but non
line of sight operation is also typically required for UAVs, such as for search and rescue
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or taking a survey of an area. In early 2012, when a person flew a UAV over a slaughter
house and found a pipe going to the nearby rivers. While this was reported as a case for
endangering public health, it also created complex issues since anyone can inspect such
violations by overflights. Continuous use of such overflights can reveal trade secrets and if
these photos go on the Internet, they can affect the business of companies [57].
Drones have various other applications in smart cities related to search and rescue,
forensics, and public safety. During a war or in any emergency situation surveillance of
a city becomes a challenging task. In such scenarios drones can be used conveniently to
avoid human calamities. Most drones come with HD cameras which provide real time
videos back to the ground station when they are flying. With advances in aerial technology,
drones can be used in public safety communications. During natural disasters, there can
be communication difficulties for public safety and in such times drones prove to be a
viable solution in creating unmanned aerial base stations (UABs). Deploying drones in
such scenarios can improve throughput coverage and help in saving lives [58, 59].
In [60], use of drones for spectrum monitoring and forensics have been studied. Spec-
trum measurements collected by drones can be compared to a database, which may help
in detecting and solving the interference problems. A prototype was built in [60] using a
DJI Phantom 2 to collect raw I/Q samples and obtain the spectrogram data which was used
for signal identification. When the drone is launched it starts looking for interference, and
when found it will try to localize the interferer. It will also change the flight plan to get
next meaningful measurement point reducing flight time
Microdrones24. can be used for surveillance, search, and rescue operations. They are
easy to deploy and have been tested under various climatic conditions. They provide live
camera feed in disastrous situations such as wildfire or heavy snow, and can also carry
thermal image cameras to identify people. To better the search and rescue operations
24https://www.microdrones.com/en/home/
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with drones, in [61], algorithms have been taught to UAVs for autonomous flying through
forests. The Search with Aerial RC Multirotor (SWARM)25. team have dedicated them-
selves in search and rescue operations with drones. This worldwide network is spread
across 33 countries with over 600 drone pilots. A related organization is UAViators26.,
whose mission is “to promote the safe, coordinated and effective use of UAVs for data col-
lection, payload delivery and communication services in a wide range of humanitarian and
development settings”.
25http://sardrones.org/
26http://uaviators.org/
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CHAPTER V
UAV Localization Using Wifi Probe Requests
Aerial surveillance has been critical topic because of its various security applications.
Drones are considered as favorites for air surveillance [62]. In worse conditions like flood,
earthquake or fire a person might be completely obstructed or in severe danger. Under
such conditions of limited visibility and clutter, it might be impossible to detect and track
multiple people using only a camera or video to implement the occupancy tracking. In this
report, we propose an approach of using Wi-Fi probe requests for occupancy tracking in an
open field with the help of Wi-Fi pineapple equipment and with help of a drone.
Probe requests are frames that are continuously broadcast from devices with Wi-Fi
technology, such as Laptop, Smartphones and tablets. When a Wi-Fi client seeks for any
access point to get connected to the Internet, the first method is scanning for beacon frames,
which are frames broadcasted by Wi-Fi routers to announce that they are available to Wi-
Fi clients. And alternatively it sends probe requests which also contain the unique MAC
address of the device, as well as its model, manufacture and type. We prefer probe request
since the Wi-Fi client can initiate a connection to a Wi-Fi router instead of waiting for a
beacon frame from the router. It‘s able to capture and decode the probe requests with a
sniffer.
We are interested in using Wi-Fi Pineapple as a sniffer to collect the data in the probe
request. This information can be used for occupancy counting in a certain field. In this
paper, we use Wi-Fi probe request captured at a certain locations for occupancy tracking in
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Figure 19: Mission Planner user interface
an opening field. We analyze the collected data which is a log using Wireshark and mission
planner.
5.1 Mission Planner
Mission Planner is a ground control station for Plane, Copter and Rover [63]. Mission
Planner user interface shown in Fig. 19 can be used as a configuration utility or as a dynamic
control supplement for your autonomous vehicle. In Mission Planner, it is possible to
analyze the telemetry logs from the sd card stored in the copter. Using an sd card reader
inserted into a laptop, the telemetry logs will be accessible. In 5.2 it is described more on
using Mission Planner in our experimentation.
Telemetry log includes all the communication messages between the ground station and
copter can be seen data in the log. These messages are known as the MAVlink command
messages which provides information about the position of its roll,pitch,yaw and other
various informations about the drone. The most important information which was required
in our experimentation is the GPS coordinates which is obtained from the telemetry logs.
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The GPS coordinates includes the latitude, longitude and relative altitude which is with
respect to the ground surface.
5.1.1 Sniffing Signals using a Virtual Private Network
In order to sniff WiFi signals, a WiFi Pineapple carried at a drone can be utilized. In our
setup, we are mounting the WiFi Pineapple on the drone along with a smartphone as shown
in Fig. 16(a), where the smartphone will provide Internet connection to WiFi Pineapple or
else a USB modem can also be used to reduce payload. There are multiple ways in which
we can access the device. One of them is using an Ethernet cable connected to the device
and the laptop. And another way is connecting it wirelessly by connecting to its AP within
its WiFi range.
Since the device mounted on the drone will be flying at heights and longer distances, it is
not possible to connect using any of the above methods. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 16(b),
we created a VPN between the WiFi Pineapple and our own devices, thus making it possi-
ble to access the device from anywhere by just providing Internet connection to the WiFi
Pineapple. VPN is basically used for client-server applications. The question might arise
about the security of these devices and what if an intruder tries to intercept the server’s
communication. The OpenVPN1., which we are using to create a virtual private network,
creates a symmetric key of size 2014 bits and is exchanged between the server and the
client using Diffie-Hellman key exchange and is expected to be very secure.
5.2 Capturing Probe Requests Data and GPS information using Mission Planner
WiFi Pineapple equipment are powered using a rechargeable battery that is connected to its
DC port. As they are portable and light in weight, they are ideal to use in our experimenta-
1https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/ OpenVPN
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Figure 20: Tracking using UAVs
tion In WiFi Pineapple equipment we use the tcpdump sniffer to capture WiFi packets. We
used a Tarot 650 UAV mounted with WiFi Pineapple Mark V and its rechargeable battery.
As one end of the telemetry was on the drone other end was attached to a laptop via USB
cable. The distance, the telemetry can maintain communication is approximately 1 mile,
providing constant status about the UAV. We selected a random path for UAV and started
flying by using a RC Controller. And the path was obtained from Mission planner as it
helped us in creating a kml and gpx file which was later imported into Google earth.
Initially we also mounted a phone attached to the WiFi Pineapple equipment so that it
stores the gps data from the phone to the pineapple and obtained data as shown in Fig. 20.
Using an android application BlueNMEA, which sends location data over Bluetooth (RF-
COMM) or TCP in the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) format GPS data
was stored. So using gpsd command in Linux, GPS of the phone was stored directly in
the sd card of the WiFi pineapple device. The information included timestamps, latitude
and longitude. As, we moved ahead in the research we came across using the telemetry
logs from the UAV to access the GPS information, which proved advantageous as the data
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provided by it was more accurate which was found after comparing the GPS from the UAV
and that of the phone. Also, it provided us altitude information which also made possible
way for 3D localization. Another advantage was we no longer need to attach the phone
with WiFi pineapple for GPS as it was available from the telemetry logs thus reducing the
payload to a certain amount with only the WiFi Pineapple and it battery on the drone.
The scripts that we use to control each WiFi Pineapple can be executed via their terminal
or using a web interface. But we used automated execution of scripts using Boot modes
which is available in WiFi Pineapple which comes with five user configurable switches
that help in execution of multiple commands using the terminal. Using the web interface,
we specify which script to run on the equipment, and as soon as the device is booted and
switches points out to our script and it starts executing commands. And as soon as the
device receives Internet from an access point it sets it correct date and time using an NTP
server.
After the whole experiment, it was now time for post processing. So, information from
both the WiFi pineapple and drone was collected and converted into an excel sheet. And
now the idea was to combine both the data and create a single excel sheet. As, probe request
messages are not received every second and only at some intervals. GPS information for
those timestamps of that of the probe requests were compared and a new data sheet with all
the information’s was created. This sheet was imported into Matlab to find reports about
our experimentation.
In Fig. 21, various manufacturers found from various probe request messages are shown.
Around 13 different manufacturers are found and 4 of the mostly seen ones are shown along
with the random MAC address whose manufacturers are unknown in the figure.
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Figure 21: Unique Devices found from different Manufacturers.
5.3 Localization using Probe Requests
After pre-processing of the data, localization techniques are used to track experimental cell-
phone. The Drone flies over the area and measures the received signal strength at different
locations. The goal is to determine a 3D location of user, and signal power at the reference
distance. The kth measurement of received signal power is expressed as
Pr,k = Po
(
dk
do
)−n
, (7)
where Po is the received power at the reference distance (do), dk is the distance between
Drone and the ground user in kth measurement, n is the pathloss exponent which for outdoor
air-to-ground communication is approximately 2. Without loss of generality we can assume
do = 1 and hence Pr,k = Pod−α. The true location of user is L : (x,y,z) and the location of
Drone at the kth time instant is Uk : (xk,yk,zk). Therefore, d =
√
(x− xk)2+(y− yk)2+(z− zk)2.
In our model, the Po and the position vector L = [x,y,z]T are unknown. To estimate
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Figure 22: RSS measurements with respect to time.
Po, we measured received signal power from a known reference location at different time
instances. Then, given the distance between the user and the Drone (di) during N reference
measurements, we estimate Po as:
Pˆo =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
Pr,idni . (8)
Now, we estimate the position vector L = [x,y,z]T using least square (LS) estimation.
Consider y as the measurement vector and e the measurement error. Then we have
y = HL+ e, (9)
where L is the position state vector, and H is the design matrix which relates the measure-
ments to the state vector.
From (7) we have:
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dk = 10(Pˆo−Pr,k)/10n. (10)
As a result, as discussed in [44],
d21−d2k = x21+ y21+ z21− x2k− y2k− z2k
−2x(x1− xk)−2y(y1− yk)−2z(z1− zk)
= 10(Pˆo−Pr,1)/5n−10(Pˆo−Pr,k)/5n. (11)
Note that, in (10) and (11), Pˆo and Pr,k are in dBw scale.
Now, considering (9) and (11), for m measurements, H can be expressed as:
H =

2x1−2x2 2y1−2y2 2z1−2z2
2x1−2x3 2y1−2y3 2z1−2z3
. . .
. . .
2x1−2xm 2y1−2ym 2z1−2zm

. (12)
Also, we can write the measurement vector as:
y =

x21+ y
2
1+ z
2
1− x22− y22− z22+10(Pˆo−Pr,2)/5n−10(Pˆo−Pr,1)/5n
x21+ y
2
1+ z
2
1− x23− y23− z23+10(Pˆo−Pr,3)/5n−10(Pˆo−Pr,1)/5n
.
.
x21+ y
2
1+ z
2
1− x2m− y2m− z2m+10(Pˆo−Pr,m)/5n−10(Pˆo−Pr,1)/5n

. (13)
Finally, the estimation of the position vector is given by [64]:
Lˆ =
(
HT H
)−1
HT y. (14)
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Figure 23: Google Earth Image of the FIU Main Campus Ground.
5.4 Experimental Results
In this section, numerical results obtained from our captured and post-processed data is
presented. We were able to obtain only few probe requests as our experimentation was
done outdoors in an open field. The data was solely taken from the WiFi pineapple and
GPS from the drone.
The flight was conducted in the FIU main campus ground with a flight time of around
10 minutes and the cumulative distribution function of RSS for the WiFi devices used for
our experimentation is shown in Fig. 22 As shown most of measurements are between
−90 dBm and −70 dBm which proves to be weak WiFi signals and proves us that those
devices are in the vicinity of the ground but not inside the ground. This information will be
useful while using for further procesing and RSS value smaller than −100 dBm can be ne-
glected to improve the results. But two of the lines in the graph which is between−65 dBm
and −55 dBm of those of that of the WiFi enabled devices used for our experiment. The
location analytics is done using least square estimation and is shown in Fig. 23 in which
the real location and experimental location is very closed to each other and is considered
viable solution for search and rescue operations or finding lost hikers. There is an error of
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around 14m between the real and experimental locations which we are debugging for more
approximation. But in a large area an estimate is enough to find the lost users.
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CHAPTER VI
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, occupancy tracking is studied by passively monitoring WiFi probe requests
captured from smart phones and tablets. We used a linear least squares technique to es-
timate the location of a mobile device based on probe request information captured at
multiple reference locations, which is then mapped into a building zone for coarse level
occupancy tracking. Our results show that probe requests can be a viable solution for oc-
cupancy monitoring in future smart buildings, which can have application such as energy
management and surveillance.
Then, a detailed study about security of drones was conducted . As drones will be more
pervasively used in future smart cities for communication and surveillance, and the need
for security measures for drones is evident. A survey on some commonly used small UAVs,
possible ways to provide cyber attacks on them, and potential interdiction mechanisms for
malicious drones. We also demonstrated De-authentication attacks to drones, and VPN
based sniffing using a WiFi Pineapple carried on a drone.
And at the end we performed experiments of localization in an outdoor environment
and detail study about mission planner was made which help us in capturing various in-
formation’s by passively monitoring WiFi probe requests captured from smart phones and
tablets and using telemetry logs for GPS information. Our results show that probe requests
can be a viable solution for occupancy monitoring and can be used in search and rescue
operation or finding lost hikers.
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